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SUMMARY
Bangladesh has had a troubled political history since gaining independence in 1971 and is also beleaguered by poverty and
natural environmental disasters. In particular however, corruption is blighting its prospects for economic growth, undermining
the rule of law and damaging the legitimacy of the political process. This article adopts a sectoral approach to the study of
corruption by examining people’s experiences of using health and education services in Bangladesh through a large scale
quantitative survey. It also presents case study research which assesses the impact of anti-corruption work by Transparency
International Bangladesh (TIB) in the areas of health and education. The article concludes that: the poorest in Bangladesh are
most penalised by corruption; there are significant benefits for health and education service users resulting from TIB’s
interventions and there is a need for committed political leadership if ongoing efforts to tackle corruption are to be effective and
sustainable. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, became an independent state after the civil war of
1971. It is a densely populated South Asian country with some 160 m people who commonly experience natural
disasters in the form of floods and cyclones in the flat land and delta of rivers on the Bay of Bengal. Poverty is
widespread with GDP per head estimated at just $444 in 2006, or almost half the population living on less than one
dollar per day (Oxford Economics, 2008). Since independence, Bangladesh has experienced political turbulence
and spent 15 years under military rule until democracy was restored in 1991. Continuing unrest has been a major
impediment to economic growth, set alongside the increasing strength of Islamic fundamentalism. Politics have
been dominated and polarised by the two largest political parties, long-time rivals the Awami League (AL) and the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The October 2001 elections produced a BNP victory in the form of a four-
party alliance. The opposition party, AL, refused to accept the result and from 2001 to 2006 their attendance at
Parliament was sporadic, claiming discrimination by the BNP speaker. Violence and political strikes/hartals have
accompanied the political turmoil. In August 2004, 20 people were killed and more than 100 injured in a grenade
attack at an AL political rally. In January 2005, the former finance minister, Shah Kibria, was assassinated along
with four colleagues and over 70 injured in an attack at an AL rally in Northern Bangladesh. Since summer 2006
opposition parties, directed by AL claimed that the BNP-led government was seeking to manipulate the electoral
infrastructure and announced in January 2007 a boycott of the general election. The parliamentary elections were
cancelled.*Correspondence to: C. Knox, School of Policy Studies, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, Co Antrim, BT37 0QB, Northern Ireland.
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118 C. KNOXOn 11 January 2007, the President declared a state of emergency and a reconstituted unelected military-backed
caretaker government was put in place. The caretaker Prime Minister, Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, governs Bangladesh
through a number of advisers who, inter alia, are carrying out reforms to the electoral system in preparation for a
poll to elect a new democratic government in December 2008. This has resulted in some 12 million duplicate,
deceased or bogus names being removed from the electoral register. Under the constitution, executive power rests
with the caretaker government until a prime minister heading a new administration is sworn in following a
parliamentary election. Foreign governments are keen to see emergency rule lifted and the restoration of full
constitutional rights amidst reports of human rights abuses and mass arrests. August 2008 witnessed signs of a
return to an elected government in the first round of local mayoral elections. Despite the introduction of a range of
electoral reforms, the election is expected to be fought between the two largest political parties. The dysfunctional
two-party system therefore looks set to continue in Bangladesh. The two major obstacles to economic progress are
lawlessness and corruption.
This article will focus on the latter by considering attempts to tackle prevasive corruption at grassroots level
through active citizen engagement in two key public services central to the daily lives of Bangladeshis. The article
will:(a) ACopynalyse people’s actual experiences (as opposed to perceptions) of corruption at grassroots level in using key
public services in the health and education sectors in Bangladesh.(b) Consider how Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) is trying to tackle abuse in these sectors and the
impact of their work on petty corruption in health and education services.(c) Draw some conclusions on the sectoral approach to tackling corruption in Bangladesh.THE LITERATURE
Corruption has been defined as ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role, because of
private-regarding pecuniary or status gains (personal, family, private clique)’ (Nye, 1967, p. 419). This
behaviour includes bribery, nepotism and misappropriation of public funds. Other definitions include the misuse
of public office for personal gain (Klitgaard et al., 2000) and the abuse of public office for ‘private economic
gain’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 75), although all three definitions erroneously suggest that corruption is limited
to the public sector. There is a limited literature on the specific problems of petty corruption in Bangladesh
despite its pervasiveness. What literature does exist tends to focus on political corruption, the misuse of power
by political leaders or within the electoral process (Younis and Mostafa, 2000; Akuter, 2001; Ahmad, 2002;
Ahmad et al., 2004; Ahmad, 2005; Kashem, 2005; Khan, 2005; Quah, 2005; Zakiuddin, 2006). The research
for this article is located in two areas of the literature. First, Ivanov (2007) is critical of the global anti-
corruption agenda and its associated universal diagnosis of the problem and calls for a move away from a global
campaign against corruption which is devoid of local context. He argues that ‘a more contextualised analysis of
corruption as a social construct could inform more successful policies’ because corruption is a ‘value-ridden
concept that should not be treated as though it were essentially the same phenomenon around the world’
(Ivanov, 2007, p. 42).
Second, Spector (2005), drawing on Kaufmann’s work (2003), argued that conventional approaches to fighting
corruption (passing laws, creating new institutions and conducting anti-corruption campaigns) have not
significantly impacted on corruption or in reducing state capture. Spector (2005) poses the question ‘is corruption in
government incurable’? He suggests not, and argues there is evidence that anti-corruption reforms which have
targeted particular programmes and sectors have made a difference:
One of the best ways to understand the spread of corruption and what can be done to control it, is by analysing
its impact sector-by-sector. International experience has demonstrated that broad anti-corruption programmes
may have positive, though short-terms, effects on the problem while raising public awareness. However,right # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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sustained over the longer term (Spector, 2005, p. 6).
In short, he claims that an approach which analyses corruption on a sector-by-sector basis and helps identify
concrete initiatives, is more likely to have an impact. As an example of sector-specific corruption in developing
countries, Vian (2005) examines corruption in health care provision arguing that it is government’s role to promote
equitable access to services, sustainable finance for health objectives and the prevention of the spread of disease. In
many cases, she contends, government failure is linked to corruption in health care which is particularly vulnerable
because of the diversity of services, the scale and expense of procurement and the nature of health care demand.
Vian (2005, p. 59) concludes that ‘much of the corruption found in the health sector is a reflection of general
problems of governance and public sector accountability’.
In a similar vein, Chapman (2005) argues that national education systems across developing countries are
particularly vulnerable to pervasive corruption. This is because: its delivery structures down to community level
make it attractive to patronage and manipulation; there are a number of significant gatekeepers at each level (district
education officers, headmasters/mistress and teachers) and, education funding is spent across multiple sites
resulting in weak monitoring and accounting systems. Chapman concludes that ‘corruption is not inevitable and is
not a life sentence for a country or government’—the key factor influencing the level of corruption is the quality of
top leadership. Leaders, he contends, ‘who respect the rule of law, emphasise transparency in the operation of the
offices they oversee, take actions against subordinates found violating rules and exhibit integrity in their own
transactions can make a difference’ (Chapman, 2005, p. 71). Azfar (2005, p. 211) arrived at similar conclusions in
an economic study of health and education in developing countries where he found that ‘corruption does in fact
undermine the delivery of health and education services and that increasing accountability reduces corruption’.
Specifically in terms of corruption in education and health services in Bangladesh, Zaman (2005) argued that it is
pervasive in the entire public health sector including hospitals attached to medical colleges, regional and sub-
regional public hospitals and clinics, offices of the civil surgeon and various population planning delivery outlets. In
education, he contended that the service suffered from misallocation of budgets and shortage of funds because of
corruption. As a result, school infrastructures are very weak, teachers are badly paid, poorly trained, teaching methods
lack innovation, and materials and equipment are inadequate to provide quality education. In short Zaman concludes:
What is striking about Bangladesh is that corruption affects almost everyone and it is hardly ever punished. On
the contrary, corruption, especially political corruption is the fastest way to the echelons of power. . .
Corruption is also a key impediment to the realisation of the UN Millennium Development Goals. . .
Corruption deprives children of access to education and prevents access of the poor to basic health services
(Zaman, 2005, p. 23).
The remainder of the article will examine people’s direct experiences of corruption as users of health and
education services, and a grassroots campaign organised through TIB to tackle rent-taking/bribery. In so doing, we
will test Spector’s assertion (2005) that one of the best ways to address corruption is on a sectoral basis.EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION AND HEALTH
Education is seen as a basic right of citizens and an investment in human capital if Bangladesh is to improve its
economy and enhance the quality of people’s lives. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
(article 15) states: It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to attain, through planned economic growth, a
constant increase of productive forces and a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of
the people, with a view to securing for its citizens: the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food,
clothing, shelter, education and medical care. The Government of Bangladesh is therefore tasked to provide
education and health care services to all citizens particularly the disadvantaged groups, such as the poor, women
and children. But the quality of education and health services is inferior.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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5000 household interview probability survey selected across 52 districts (out of 64) within the six divisions of
Bangladesh. A three-stage stratified cluster sampling method was used to select households: primary sampling
units or Mauzas were randomly selected from each strata; a block of 200 households was randomly selected from
each primary sampling unit and 20 households were selected systematically for interview. The survey was
conducted in June to July 2007 and probed questions on corruption in the previous 12-month period.
The key findings from the survey were: OCoverall 66.7 per cent of households experienced corruption in their interactions with different public service
providers. An overwhelming 96.6 per cent of households that interacted with law enforcement agencies
experienced corruption. Land administration (52.7%) and judiciary (47.7%) are the next most corrupt sectors.
Nearly two-fifths of those households which interacted with education and health experienced corruption. Corruption is pervasive in Bangladesh and remains unabated with no significant difference between 2006 and
2007. In some sectors corruption in the form of bribery has increased but decreased in others. The incidence of
bribery, for example, has increased in education, health, land administration, local government and the NGO
sectors. The sectors where bribery has decreased: law enforcement, judiciary, electricity, banking and tax, may
have been as a result of the focussed anti-corruption drive by the caretaker government from January 2007. Households paid bribes (42.1%) for receiving services from different sectors, an average of Taka 4134 per
household or Taka 861 per capita (about 60 and 12.5$, respectively). The average amount of bribe paid by a
household is the highest for those receiving services from banking, followed by judiciary, land administration
and law enforcement. In urban areas, higher bribe amounts are paid for interaction with education, health, land
administration, law enforcement and banking sectors. In rural areas, higher bribe payments are made through
interaction with electricity and local government. Bribery represents 3.84 per cent per capita income of an average Bangladeshi citizen (Transparency Inter-
national Bangladesh, 2008a).
We consider people’s experiences of education and health services more specifically.EDUCATION
Data from the survey revealed that 72.6 per cent of respondents (n¼ 3629) had used education services in the
previous 12 months. This level of service usage represented the highest interaction with services examined in the
survey which included: education, electricity, health, NGOs, banking, tax, land administration, local government,
law enforcement and the judiciary. In terms of the experiences of service users, 34.7 per cent of them had
encountered corruption in education under various guises: bribery, negligence of duties, nepotism, embezzlement
or deception. The breakdown of these figures is shown in Figure 1.Figure 1. Corruption in education (n¼ 1260). This figure is available in colour online at www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/pad
pyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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things as: poor time keeping, irregular classes (absenteeism), delays in releasing exam results and lack of interest
and motivation by teachers in their jobs.
To further understand which factors influence/predict corruption in the education sector in Bangladesh, we
conducted logistic regressions. We were interested in finding out which variables predict the likelihood of education
service users paying bribes (as one element of corruption). In this case, we selected the categorical dependent
variable and predictor variables as follows:
Survey question: did you pay a ‘donation’ or bribe for admission to education services?
Categorical dependent variable
Paybribe: Did you pay a donation or bribe for admission?
Predictor variables
Toincome: total household income per month.
Locate: area/location of respondents.
Sex: gender of the respondent.
Type: type of institution (government/non-government and private).
Time: regularity and timeliness of teachers.
Tutor: respondent’s children attend their teachers as a private tutor.
Addben: additional benefits gained (prior sight of exam papers and additional marks).
The results are shown in Appendix 1.
The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a significant value ( p< .05) and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test
supports the conclusion that the model is a good fit (x2 value of 4.654 and p> .05). The model summary statistics
indicate that between 27.7 and 42.6 per cent of the variability in the dependent variable is explained by this set of
predictor variables. The Wald test shows that three variables contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the
model (significance <.05): whether children employ their teachers as private tutors; the total household income of
the family and the gender of the victim of corruption. The results suggest that those who paid a bribe at admission
are: less likely to employ private tutors; are from lower income groups and males (probably as the head of
household). We now turn to people’s experiences of health care in Bangladesh.HEALTH
The survey data showed that 44.7 per cent of respondents (n¼ 2234) had used health services in the previous
12 months. In terms of their experiences as service users, 41.8 per cent of them had encountered corruption in health
under various guises: bribery, negligence of duties, nepotism, embezzlement or deception. The breakdown of these
figures is shown in Figure 2 where bribery and negligence are the highest forms of corruption experienced by health
service users. These will take the form of: doctors charging for writing prescriptions; referring patients to their
private clinics and having to pay extra fees for pathological tests in government health facilities.
To further understand which factors influence/predict corruption in the health sector in Bangladesh, we
conducted logistic regressions. We were interested in finding out which variables predict the likelihood of health
service users paying bribes (as one element of corruption). In this case, we selected the categorical dependent
variable and predictor variables as follows:
Survey question: did you pay any extra money (excluding fees) for hospital treatment?
Categorical dependent variable
Paybribe: Did you pay any extra money for hospital treatment?Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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Toincome: total household income per month.
Locate: area location of respondents.
Sex: gender of the respondent.
Private: advised to go to private clinic.
Diagnose: doctors press you to go to a certain diagnostic centre.
Prescrip: paid money for prescription.
The results are shown in Appendix 2.
The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a significant value (p< .0005) and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test
supports the conclusion that the model is a good fit (x2 value of 7.852 and p> .05). The model summary statistics
indicate that between 10 and 16 per cent of the variability in the dependent variable is explained by this set of
predictor variables (this is a lower level of explanation than the education model above). The Wald test shows that
two variables contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model (significance <.05): whether the patient
pays the doctor for writing a prescription; and if the doctors press service users to go to a specific diagnostic centre.
The results suggest that patients who have to pay extra money for hospital treatment are: more likely to be those for
whom the doctor must write a prescription; and those who are pressed by doctors to go to a certain diagnostic centre.
Comparing both education and health provision the data indicate that while negligence by professionals in these
services is a major problem (51% in education and 43% in health), there is much greater prevalence of bribery in the
health sector (20% in education and 52% in health). We now consider how TIB, as a major anti-corruption agency,
is tackling petty corruption in these core services.
TACKLING PETTY CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION AND HEALTH
TIB is an accredited national chapter of Berlin-based Transparency International, a global civil society organisation
leading the fight against corruption. TIB began its activities as a trust in 1996, and in 1998 the Government of
Bangladesh approved its registration as an independent, non-partisan, not-for-profit, non-governmental
organisation. TIB’s vision for Bangladesh is a country in which government, politics, business, civil society
and the daily lives of its citizens are free from corruption. To secure this vision, its mission statement is:
To catalyse and strengthen a participatory social movement to promote and develop institutions, laws and
practices for combating corruption in Bangladesh, and to establish an efficient and transparent system of
governance, politics and business (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2007, p. 8).
The ‘social movement’ operationalises its mission statement through the TIB Making Waves project (2003–
2008). TIB works against corruption, not against the government of the day, nor any particular public sectorCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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change conducive to the reduction in corruption. It has no mandate or capacity to investigate or take action against
individual cases or allegations of corruption, whether large or small. TIB is a co-stakeholder and a source of support
to initiatives for reducing corruption and establishing transparent and accountable governance in Bangladesh
including those by Government. As the public sector is at the heart of corruption and there is a lack of political will
at the highest level to tackle this insidious problem, local people as victims have a key role to play in exerting
pressure for change. TIB has been growing a social movement which empowers people to take responsibility for
tackling the worst excesses of corruption by channelling bottom-up efforts into a positive force for change in
Bangladesh.
The key mechanisms through which Making Waves impacts on reducing corruption and generating
accountability in education and health at local level are: committees of concerned citizens (CCCs); volunteer youth
groups (youth engagement and support, YES); advice and information desks (AI desks); report cards and people’s
theatre which we consider in more detail.
CCCs are local level watchdogs and a key pillar in TIB’s social movement against corruption. There are a
number of steps involved in their formation as follows:1. T1Es
S/h









S/h








CopIB undertakes the primary selection of possible areas in a geographical cluster within which a CCC could be
formed (with the ultimate aim of covering the whole of Bangladesh).2. A long list is prepared of potential CCC members with all the relevant information.3. The Committee is formed and a memorandum of understanding between the CCC and TIB is signed along with
the adoption of the CCC operational manual.4. Implementation of CCC programmes begin.
The long term objective of the CCC movement is to create accountable governance in Bangladesh at local levels
through greater transparency in public, semi-public, non-profit and private sector transactions, leading to gender
sensitive and sustainable poverty reduction. The immediate objective of CCCs is to function as community
watchdog forums for creating anti-corruption awareness and mobilising citizens for participation in various anti-
corruption initiatives (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2007). The CCCs are groups of citizens selected on
the basis of: (i) high degree of moral and social standing and credibility within their own communities;
(ii) commitment to the values, mission and code of ethics of TIB and (iii) ability to influence and mobilise local
government officials, service providers and the public to curb corruption.1 CCC members, at least 25 per cent of
whom must be females, are drawn largely from professional groups such as teachers, lawyers, journalists,sential criteria for membership of CCCs
e should be:
a person of high integrity and honesty;
a transparent person having no known ‘skeletons in the cupboard’;
widely respected, locally influential and acceptable to all;
active and interested to work voluntarily;
a person who shares the vision, mission, values and objectives of TIB and is committed to TIB Code of Ethics;
a permanent citizen of Bangladesh and resident of the CCC area;
involved in bona fide legal activities;
income tax payer (with TIN if applicable) with legal income from a known source and
conscious, enlightened, tolerant, proactive, patriotic and optimistic.
e should not be:
a person with any record of involvement in corruption;
an un-discharged insolvent;
convicted of a criminal offence involving moral turpitude, declared by a competent court to be of unsound mind;
a public servant enjoying any special status granted by law enabling participation in the conduct of and management of a legal entity;
actively involved in party politics;
guilty of any default of any public dues determined by a court of law;
less than 30 years nor more than 70 years of age and
immediate family member of the executive director of TIB and any other full-time member of the TIB staff.
yright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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partisan. Volunteer youth groups of local students/young people (usually aged between 15 and 30 years and
unlimited in numbers) are mobilised and attached to the CCCs. They involve themselves in awareness raising
activities. By undertaking various tailor-made programmes, these young people learn the core values of
volunteerism and prepare themselves as future leaders of the anti-corruption social movement. They also develop
the commitment and leadership qualities needed to expand and strengthen the anti-corruption constituency. The
activities of these groups entitled YES include debating competitions, publications, anti-corruption campaigns,
cycle rallies, human chains against corruption and cartoon exhibitions.
Once the committees are formed, they must work on at least one school, one hospital and one local government
body, but are otherwise free to draw up their own independent programme priorities and annual plan of work. TIB
provides the technical and financial support in implementing the programmes and acts as a catalyst for CCCs in
advocating changes generated by their local successes at the national level. Six CCCs were formed in the greater
Mymensingh area in 2000. Based on their success, another 30 committees were formed in July 2006—in total
36 CCCs are working in 34 districts across all six divisions in Bangladesh. CCCs have been established in clusters
with the aim of ‘shadowing’ the local government Upazila and District structures. There are plans to increase the
number of CCCs by a further nine (from 36 to 45) to improve geographical coverage nationwide by the end of 2009
(Transparency International Bangladesh, 2008a). TIB will establish CCCs in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and
extreme north-west areas of Bangladesh which are populated by vulnerable, marginalised and hard core poor
people (including Char dwellers). Because grassroots activists are seen as fundamental to the success of the social
movement against corruption, TIB invests in training and capacity building of CCC members, associated volunteer
youth groups and theatre activists, which is financed by donor partners.2 Approximately, 2.5 per cent of the
(proposed) budget (£9.8 m) for 2009–2013 has been allocated to capacity building at the local level. Typically, this
includes training in areas such as: social mobilisation, tackling corruption, good governance, networking,
marketing and communication, gender awareness and training, financial sustainability, local level advocacy and
campaigning.
Apart from various anti-corruption awareness activities, the focus of the CCCs’ watchdog functions is normally
on improving key public services. The primary instrument used to achieve concrete changes in public service
delivery is the use of report card surveys and their follow-up. Report card surveys are conducted by the CCCs in
consultation with local people to examine issues which most directly affect their daily lives, typical of which are:
health, education, land administration and local government. The surveys make an assessment of the content and
quality of public services provided to local people and highlight the nature, process and implications of corruption
at local levels. Reports are then used to advocate and demand public accountability from service providers (see
Table 1). People’s theatre is one of the major advocacy tools of TIB which is used at the local level to build
awareness against corruption, particularly amongst the most vulnerable and illiterate. AI desks provide access to
information which is key to creating awareness and helping people to resist and become victims of corruption. TIB
has set up AI desks attached to the CCCs and in satellite format. Members of the public are provided access to basic
information and advice on key public services. The annual work plans of CCCs provide the mechanism against
which they report on their outputs, share their activities across the wider social movement and use lessons learned in
developing the work of new CCCs. This sharing of practical knowledge is facilitated formally through regular
newletters and an annual convention of the CCCs.IMPACT ON PETTY CORRUPTION
To assess the impact of TIB’s work on education and health services for the period 2003–2008, we adopted a mixed
methods approach involving: secondary data analysis; interviews with key stakeholders; field work visits to, and
case studies of, CCCs and focus group work with education and health service users and victims of corruption at2At present Transparency International Bangladesh has the following donor partners: Department for International Development UK (DFID);
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); Embassy of Norway and UNDP.
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126 C. KNOXcase study locations. Impact assessments are undertaken to estimate whether or not interventions produce their
intended effects. In strict methodological terms, determining impact requires comparing, with as much rigour as is
practicable, the conditions of targets/recipients that have experienced an intervention with those of equivalent
targets/recipients who have not, using quantitative designs such as randomised experiments, quasi-experiments,
before and after studies and so on. Due to the complex and often hidden nature of corruption, quantitative methods
were ruled out and we relied on narrative accounts from providers and users of education and health service in case
study locations.
The selection of the CCC case study locations was a particularly important choice and we used the following
criteria to inform the process: length of time CCCs had been established; CCCs perceived by TIB to be ‘successful’
through to ‘less successful’; gender diversity within CCCs and an area without a CCC to act as a counterfactual for
comparison in assessing impact.
The case study areas selected to gather evidence of impact were:(1) NCopyatore: Natore Sadar Hospital; Moshironnessa Government Primary School and Laksmipur Union Parishad.(2) Chapai Nawabgonj: Chapai Nawabgonj Sadar Hospital; Bidirpur Government Primary School and Chapai
Nawabgonj Municipality.(3) Rajshahi: Rajshahi Municipality, Education Board and School Management Committee.(4) Gazipur: Gazipur Municipality.(5) Naogaon: local hospital, primary school and NGO group (control area).By its nature, a case study approach has inherent methodological weaknesses. The trade-off in securing depth
and richness of qualitative information in five-case study areas is lack of generalisability. That said, the selection of
our case study areas was judicious and we used secondary data on CCCs which we did not visit to validate our
findings. In addition, researchers must be careful attributing changes/impacts to an intervention (before and after
studies) without the benefit of an experimental design approach.
Through the case studies, we met with CCC and YES members in all areas (except the control area), and a mix of
groups ranging across: teachers, school management committees and mothers of students, victims of corruption,
hospital users and health watch groups. We also held meetings directly with health providers, nurses, doctors, civil
surgeons, school principals and elected representatives in each of the case study areas. The field work for the
research was conducted during March/April 2008. We summarise the findings from the qualitative data gathered
through interviews, focus groups and non-participant observation in education and health services.
The education sector
The CCCs actively engaged with primary schools in the case study areas, a key improvement being the significant
number of eligible students now enroled. Student attendance had not been satisfactory and CCCs intervened to
address this and other issues. They met with school management committees and guardians, organised workshops
and promotional campaigns along with awards aimed at incentivising attendance. As a result, student enrolments
have increased and text books are available for free distribution to students. The scholarship pass rate has also
improved. Teachers, the school management committees and guardians are now jointly engaged in providing better
education for the children in an accountable and transparent way. Teacher attendance and performance in their jobs
are being closely monitored by CCCs. A key element in maintaining pressure for change is ‘mothers gatherings’
where mothers/guardians meet with school management committees and call them to account for the behaviour of
teachers. As recipients of education services they are best placed to provide CCCs with information to monitor and
enforce change. TIB uses local transparency and accountability as a way of ‘naming and shaming’ schools which
are underperforming by directly confronting teachers, principals and management committees with the implicit
‘threat’ of exposure in the press/media.
The health sector
CCC members and the YES group have worked consistently with hospitals in the case study areas to improve health
services. They have met with the authorities and identified gaps in their provision. They prepared information bookletsright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 29, 117–132 (2009)
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128 C. KNOXabout the nature and types of health care services available which they distributed through satellite AI desks. In
addition, the YES group members have organised public theatre shows and exchanged views with people from the
hospitals’ catchment areas. As a result, there have been some significant developments in health provision such as an
improvement in the ticketing system. Previously, the price of a ticket for services in the out-patients department was
4.40 Taka, but patients paid 5.00 Taka due to ‘lack of change’ being available. Now a fund has been created, in
collaboration with hospital authorities, for patients in poverty with the extra 60 paisa received from each ticket.
Medicine supplies were also very low. Following the intervention by CCC and YES members, supplies have
increased and the list of medicines available is on public display. The behaviour of doctors, nurses and ancillary
staff towards patients has also improved. An ambulance service is available for which patients do not make
additional payments, patients tests are carried out in the pathology departments of the hospitals (as opposed to a
private clinic) and toilet facilities have been significantly improved. Finally, the issue of cleanliness is a higher
priority although has still some way to go. Interesting though, the control hospital visited was displaying
information on prices and medicine in response to a Ministry of Health circular requesting this in all hospitals. We
summarise the case study education and health services before CCC intervention, following intervention and the
nature of the impacts in Table 2.
To institutionalise change beyond the confines of the local school and hospital, TIB has begun a process of
creating ‘islands of integrity’, a concept developed by Transparency International. An island of integrity is where an
individual school or hospital makes a public commitment to continue its work without engaging in bribery or to
disclose their actions if they do resort to bribes. Following such a public commitment, CCCs and YES groups
monitor their adherence to these principles of transparency, accountability and integrity, implied by their
declaration. For example, in the case of a school, it would become an island of integrity if the school management
committee held regular meetings, operated transparent accounts where students did not pay additional ‘fees’,
ensured good levels of attendance by pupils and teachers alike and delivered academic results. Similarly, in
hospitals, the public would have open access to necessary information about health services and the range of
medicines which were available. No additional charges would be levied for standard health checks and tests.
TIB will, in turn, promote ‘integrity pacts’ with public bodies as a means of maximising accountability,
transparency and integrity in the wider public sector (see Figure 3). The ‘integrity pact’ is a tool developed by
Transparency International to help stakeholders—governments, businesses and citizens—fight corruption in
specific sectors and institutions of public interest. The pact is an agreement between stakeholders under which all
parties have rights and obligations that neither side will: (a) abuse entrusted power for private gain; (b) pay, offer,
demand or accept bribes for services rendered or public contracts made or while carrying out and (c) collude with
each other including competitors to obtain a contract. Any violations will entail sanctions. In practical terms, the
‘integrity pact’ institutionalises the commitment of ‘islands of integrity’ where the whole is greater than the sum of
the parts. For instance, the Chair and members of a Union Parishad will formally sign an integrity pact to be
accountable and transparent to all service users for the range of functions which they provide. TIB will advocate for
district education officers, civic surgeons, mayors or municipality chairs in each CCC to sign an ‘integrity pact’
demonstrating their public commitment to public accountability, transparency and integrity.Figure 3. Promoting change in health and education. This figure is available in colour online at www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/pad
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There are a number of conclusions which can be drawn from this two-part study comprising a quantitative analysis
of people’s direct experiences of corruption in education and health services, and a qualitative assessment of the
work of TIB in selected case study areas.
First, the empirical results from the survey highlight the prevalence of petty corruption in the delivery of health
and education services in Bangladesh—42 and 35 per cent, respectively. The incidence of public services
corruption in rank order in Bangladesh is: law enforcement, local government, land administration, the judiciary,
followed by health and education (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2008b, p. 14). In health care those users
who are most vulnerable to corruption are patients needing a prescription from the doctor and those requiring
further medical tests who are coerced to attend a private diagnostic centre of the doctor’s choice. In education, lower
income groups and males are more likely to have to pay bribes at admission and, as a consequence, are less likely to
need to employ private tutors. These findings broadly reflect the empirical results from the Transparency
International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2007) which interviewed 63,199 people in 60 countries (Bangladesh
is not included). The barometer study concluded that the poor are most penalised by corruption. Reported bribery
across regions varied considerably and in the Asia-Pacific group of countries 22 per cent of respondents had paid a
bribe in the past year.3 This is significantly lower than petty bribery in health and education services in Bangladesh.
The barometer report concludes that ‘the poorest in all societies are the ones hit hardest by bribery. However, as they
face the most demands for bribes, they are more likely to pay. This, in turn, means that corruption acts as a
regressive tax that increases income inequality’ (Transparency International, 2007, p. 13).
Second, the case study evidence on the work of TIB demonstrates both the tangible impact their work at
grassroots level is having and its potential as a social movement for expansion. The mobilisation of concerned
citizens and young people who act as a watchdog over education and health providers has increased local
accountability and produced a level of financial savings either for reinvestment in public services or a reduction in
petty corruption for users. TIB intends to scale-up these activities beyond individual schools and hospitals in the
next phase of its development (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2008a). They will do this by
institutionalising ‘integrity pacts’ with public bodies as a means of maximising accountability, transparency
and integrity in the wider public sector. These grassroots activities operate alongside work by TIB at the national
level which includes: monitoring and holding to account the key pillars of the National Integrity System; diagnostic
studies on institutions where the level of corruption is perceived to be high; supporting the work of the anti-
corruption commission (set up under the caretaker government in February 2007) and, major advocacy campaigns
to raise awareness of people’s entitlements to public services.
Finally, an examination of the Bangladesh case attests to key messages from the anti-corruption literature. This
country study lends support to Spector’s thesis (2005) that fighting corruption on a sectoral basis is more likely to
yield positive results. However, it does so in a specific context where the decentralised approach adopted by TIB has
facilitated local accountability of service providers. Quah’s (2006) argument that the control of corruption will only
be effective if supported by strong political leadership is particularly relevant in Bangladesh where its key
politicians (Khaleda Zia (BNP) and Sheihk Hasina (AL)) had been jailed on corruption charges, although the latter
is in exile in America following release on medical parole, while the former was subsequently released on bail.
Despite the launch of an anti-corruption drive by the caretaker government, progress has been initially slow and
mired in legal disputes, and at the time of writing has become a hostage to political expediency in a situation where
the top priority is holding elections which ensure participation of all major parties. This has led to the release of
most of the high-profile corruption suspects who were earlier refused bail. As a result, the future anti-corruption
drive in general and the fate of the anti-corruption cases have become uncertain. Even with the implementation of
electoral reforms, the return of the old guard, eager to access public funds after nearly 2 years in the political
wilderness, looks inevitable. So, entrenched is corruption within the two main parties that the work spearheaded by3The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2007) Asia-Pacific countries included: Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
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130 C. KNOXTIB and the anti-corruption commission may well falter. Bracking’s (2007, p. 23) review of anti-corruption
campaigns ends with ‘a call for more contextual understandings of the politics and political economy of different
countries and areas’. In the politics of Bangladesh, greater democratisation and the return of an elected government
may ironically reinforce or exacerbate problems of corruption.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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APPENDIX 1: CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION
Did you pay a ‘donation’ or bribe for admission to education services?
Variables in the equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig.
SEX 2.267 1.229 4.403 1 .045
TYPE .400 .893 .200 1 .654
TIME .871 .930 .879 1 .349
TUTOR S2.382 1.062 5.029 1 .025
LOCATE .622 1.057 .347 1 .556
TOINCOME .000 .000 4.435 1 .042
ADDBEN S1.079 1.671 .417 1 .519
Constant S1.237 2.493 .246 1 .620
Omnibus tests of model coefficients
x2 df Sig.
Step 1 Step 17.807 7 .013
Block 17.807 7 .013
Model 17.807 7 .013
Hosmer and Lemeshow test
Step x2 df Sig.
1 4.654 7 .702
Model summary
Step S2 log likelihood Cox and Snell R square Nagelkerke R square
1 39.898(a) .277 .426
APPENDIX 2: CORRUPTION IN HEALTH
Did you pay any extra money (excluding fees) for hospital treatment?
Variables in the equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig.
PRESCRIP 1.758 .398 19.561 1 .000
DIAGNOSE .666 .396 4.826 1 .043
PRIVATE .218 .384 .323 1 .570
TOINCOME .000 .000 .171 1 .679
LOCATE S.161 .391 .169 1 .681
SEX .385 .451 .730 1 .393
Constant S2.180 .550 15.725 1 .000
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Omnibus tests of model coefficients
x2 df Sig.
Step 1 Step 26.342 6 .000
Block 26.342 6 .000
Model 26.342 6 .000
Hosmer and Lemeshow test
Step x2 df Sig.
1 7.852 8 .448
Model summary
Step S2 log likelihood Cox and Snell R square Nagelkerke R square
1 218.639(a) .100 .160
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